India shuld stand up for its N-rights, deal or no deal

India should stand up for its nuclear rights, deal or no deal
Venkata Vemuri


The level of political debate in India on the Nuclear deal with the US is as abysmal as the surreptitious attempt by the Indian bureaucracy to push it through on the ground that it is a matter of national pride. Neither the Left, nor the Opposition, and certainly not the Manmohan Singh government, has taken the Indian public into confidence on the real issues that are of concern.

These issues are crucial for India’s long-term foreign and nuclear policies. We should be more concerned with India’s strategic role vis-à-vis a futuristic – but possible -- stand-off between China and the US, rather than the short-term gains in terms of nuclear energy or the one-upmanship game with Pakistan. India is already capable of tackling the last two.

Let us proceed step by step. What did we achieve after the 1998 nuclear tests? It is an unspoken truth that the tests failed to validate India’s warhead designs. When we talk of warheads, we can only be talking of nuclear missiles capable of reaching China, not Pakistan. Only when we have such missiles can we be confident that India has a credible nuclear deterrent. How do we reach that stage? Naturally by conducting more nuclear tests.

Is India in a position to conduct more such tests? India has offered a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear testing. If the N-deal comes through, the moratorium will no longer be voluntary, but legally binding on us. The proposed amendment to US law that will make the N-deal official is that the American President will, from time to time, certify that India has not tested a nuclear device. Which means, if India conducts a test in the future, the deal becomes void.

So, without a nuclear test, any thought of becoming a nuclear power or having a credible nuclear deterrent is a pipe dream.

The issue relates to availability of fissionable material for nuclear weaponisation. India has agreed, under the draft agreement of the deal, to identify and separate civil and military nuclear programmes. India has also agreed to place the civil facilities under the IAEA.

There are two issues here. One, the deal will not overnight give India the status of a nuclear weapons state. Far from it. It will be recognized as a non-nuclear weapons state which is not a signatory to the NPT. To that extent, India will be better off than Pakistan. That is not what India will be satisfied with, but has no option but to accept it.

Secondly, once the civil facilities are under IAEA safeguards, there will be restrictions on the fissionable material for use in India’s military facilities. India’s nuclear doctrine depends on the availability of this material. For, the number of nuclear warheads India wishes to have to achieve the critical state of deterrence is determined by, first of all, India’s threat perception and next, the material available for weaponisation.

According to India’s nuclear doctrine as it stands today, the limit of critical deterrence depends on its threat perception. Which means India can increase its nuclear stockpile if the threat perception increases. Such a doctrine allows India the advantage of not having to tie itself to a certain number of warheads. However, the IAEA safeguards will mean, at least theoretically, a weakened deterrence if India’s adversaries increase their stockpiles. For, in such a situation, increasing India’s own stockpile will depend on how much un-safeguarded material is available to it.

Having said that, the safeguards issue is not as serious as the moratorium on testing. It is well known that India has the capability to develop its own nuclear plants. Moreover, despite the agreement it will remain India’s right to classify future nuclear plants as civil or military, thus giving the country an escape valve.

What the entire debate on the deal boils down to, is this: Does India feel it requires a credible nuclear deterrent against China? If so, it has to clearly state its position before the current form of the deal is signed. Otherwise, its dream of having a credible deterrent and being a major nuclear power is washed out.

Yes, India needs a nuclear deterrent against China insofar as its future geo-political stakes are concerned. Then why is the current Indian government shying away from stating this to the US? One point that goes in India’s favour – and a very vital one at that – is that the US cannot face a standoff with China without the support of India. For facing China, both need each other. It is also true that the US excursions into Asia have a black and bleak record of failure. Vietnam, for example. In the future, any standoff with China can only be on the issue of Taiwan. And the odds of the US going it alone, without India’s aid, are high.

Let us just assume that the current deal actually goes through. Theoretically it is possible that the US itself may go in for nuclear testing in the future, thus allowing India to do so too. How is that possible? The current deal has a clause which says that India will assume responsibilities and reap the same benefits as accruing to states with advanced nuclear technology like the US. The flip side, however, is what if the US does not undertake tests in future?

It is a big if.

The nuclear deal by itself does not much harm Indian interests as long as India retains the right to conduct nuclear tests in the future. Indian bureaucrats, like the messy mice that they are, are already indulging in vacuous arguments that India’s moratorium on tests is unilateral and therefore, what is a unilateral proposition cannot be bound by an agreement. The why not get this included in the piece of paper?

India is at present in a political turmoil over the deal. It may all come to a naught if the deal is not passed in the current session of the US Congress. The basic legal paper of the deal, called the Hyde Act, 2006, has a provision that the final agreement between the US and India can be taken up by the Congress for passage only if the Congress is in a continuous session for 30 days. There is a recess of the Congress in August, which leaves less than 40 days before the Congress adjourns on September 26, 2008. The agreement cannot come for passage until the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group okay the deal. How long will that take? If it takes more than a fortnight, there is no option but to wait for the post-Bush administration to assume office. What have the Democrats in mind about the deal?

More importantly, when will India stand up for its own rights? That is the prime issue. What is happening in India right now has so far nothing to do with this serious debate.