India has to convince the
international community that the Indian Air Force (IAF) foray into Pakistani
territory in the pre-dawn hours of February 26 to drop bombs on a reported
training camp of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) is not an act of political symbolism but
a strategic act that came at the end of years of extreme provocation in the
form of sponsored terrorism on Indian territory that spawned the Pulwama attack
less than a fortnight ago.
Of course, the attack
provides the much-needed succour to a section of war-mongering citizenry
post-Pulwama. The clamour has certainly died down instantly, turning into a
celebration of the proof of Indian might.
Pakistan, on the face of it,
has limited options: It can realise that India is quite serious this time and
try to wind up the terror outfits. Or, is can remain cussed and retaliate.
Either way, its bluff stands called. Formally. That is the biggest import of
India’s strike-back, notwithstanding the various issues involved.
What Pakistan does is yet
unknown. But what are its limitations?
*Pak denied the 2016 surgical
strikes. Today it comes up with a slightly better response: Gives photographic
evidence of IAF payload which it claims was “dropped” by the IAF in their
“haste”.
*Pak has four options. One,
retaliate. The question is, what kind/level/degree of retaliation and
penetration into India? India had surprise on its side. Pak will not have that.
*Two, play the victim to
India’s “aggression” in front of the international community. How will anyone
believe it without evidence? What evidence? Evidence in terms of those killed
by the attack. That will mean accepting there were casualties. But that too is
not enough. Because there will be questions: Who are these dead people Are they
civilian Pakistanis? Are they not? Are they terrorists? Are they residents of a
terror camp? After all, the IAF did precision bombing, not a general attack.
That means there was something going on at the camp, isn’t it? So many
questions. For the record, Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations,
Major General Asif Ghafoor, in a series of tweets said the "Indian
aircrafts intruded from Muzaffarabad sector in Azad Jammu and Kashmir",
which falls across the Line of Control. He also downplayed the losses, saying no
infrastructure was hit.
*Three, reach out to its
current benefactor, China which has strenuously thwarted India’s attempts to
declare Masood Azhar a global terrorist. It can reach out also to Saudi Arabia,
but India, through the meeting between Modi and the visiting Crown Prince, may
have come to an understanding about the options before India to avenge Pulwama.
It can reach out also to the US, but President Trump has of late not been in
any mood to tolerate Pak on the issue of harbouring terrorists. In 2018, he had
cut American aid worth $1.3 billion. On top of it all, India has got an invite
to the next OIC meeting which represents the who’s who of the Islamic nations
of the world. In such a situation, who can Pakistan really turn to, to get
moral support?
*Four, take action against
JeM and give evidence to the international community.
*Five, it can do nothing and
carry on as if nothing happened.
India, on the other hand, has
to ensure that nothing happens that erodes the credibility of the military
action. (That’s what happened with the surgical strikes of 2016 which were
belittled by the political class in India for various reasons.)
How can that happen?
*One, India will have to
provide concrete evidence of existence of the camp at Balakot. This is to silence the doubting Thomases. The New York
Times in an early report already said: “Analysts and diplomats in New
Delhi said the targets of the Indian airstrikes were unclear, as any terrorist
groups operating along the border would have cleared out in recent days after
Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India vowed retaliation over the Kashmir
attack.” Does it mean that the Americans are skeptical?
*Two, the Indian response has
escalated since 2016. The surgical strikes were a tactical response across the
LoC; recalled how the DGMO briefed the media at that time. But the IAF strike
is a strategic one. The foreign secretary briefed the media. The NSA oversaw
the strike plan. The Prime Minister gave the formal green signal for the
operation. During the 2016 strikes, India crossed the LoC. What about
this time? Foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale says the JeM camp was in Balakot.
*If Pakistan’s reaction is to
retaliate, Indian reaction can only escalate further. What is the next step?
And where will this stand-off end or lead to? India should have an answer.
Primarily because, India, like Pakistan, is a nuclear-weapons state.
*The Indian foreign
secretary’s statement does not say the IAF entered Pakistani territory. It
merely says they entered Balakot. Which means, in actuality, India crossed not
just the LoC, but the international border, and struck the ‘camp’ inside
Pakistani territory. Balakot is in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Will that be the new
normal? Will the attack be portrayed as an “attack on JeM camp” instead of
saying the IAF entered Pak territory? Will it wash?
*The carefully worded Indian
foreign secretary’s statement does not qualify Balakot’s demographic address.
Is it inside PoK or Pakistan? Pakistan, on the other hand, does not say the IAF
entered Pakistani territory, claiming instead that the intrusion was in PoK
(Azad Jammu and Kashmir). Are both sides not really getting into the territory
angle because of the obvious implications? Does it look like a measure of
non-escalation?
*What else can it be, if
India appears to be gallant in refraining from saying where Balakot really is
and if Pakistan appears to be downplaying the incident by claiming it did ‘not’
happen in Pak territory but in PoK? Did India come up with a fantastic strategy
which helped it hit two birds with one shot: The strike douses public war
clamour and at the same time it is a ‘cheekily’ daring attack that may not
result in a major military reprisal by Pakistan.
*Three, India will be ready
to answer when asked: What is the overall objective? Is it against Pak
supporting/sponsoring terrorist action in India? Or is it to target the heads
of terror outfits hiding in Pakistan and plotting against India? Because, one
is different from other – even though they are linked – in terms of operational
strategies and bilateral and international ramifications.
*Four, India should come out
with the evidence as early as possible to nip in the bud any attempt to
politicize the attack for electoral gains.
*Five, India’s response to
the international community post-strike will depend on one question: Does India
need to justify its action, given that the international community, including
the US and China, till date, has done really nothing to force Pakistan to
remove terror outfits from its soil and refrain from sponsoring attacks on
India. Even India’s ‘friends’, like Japan, Germany, France and UK, have not
even provided lip service.
*Six, on the eve of the IAF
strike, the growing pressure to remove Article 35(A) and 370 (SC is hearing the
35A question) made former JK chief minister Mehbooba Mufti take a strident line
of warning that such a decision will alienate the Kashmiris from the mainland.
Another former CM, Omar Abdullah, happened to support her, saying it was the
reality on the ground in Kashmir. Now, after the IAF strike, how India
straddles the two – the frosted bilaterals with Pakistan and internal rancor on
Kashmir – will have far-reaching implications. Any incautious step or action
can precipitate matters, internally in the Kashmir Valley. As it is, the
anti-Kashmiri sentiment is being fomented by a fringe section in India.
