This Is Not Breaking News

Tuesday, November 24, 2009 New Delhi Today's Issue
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OPED Tuesday, December 16, 2008 Email Print

This is not breaking news

Venkata Vemuri

Trivialising a terrorist strike story by making its coverage indistinguishable from that of a sensational story has left 24x7 news channels looking utterly silly and frightfully immature. Broadcast journalism in India is no longer in its infancy and its practitioners claim they are masters at their job. It's time for them to prove itI was a broadcast journalist in India and so when news about the string of terror attacks in Mumbai broke on the evening of November 26, I knew exactly what to expect from the television channels there. They would 'break' the news, send their OB vans to the spot and lay siege to it, the coverage will be characterised by visuals running in loops, anchors and field reporters saying the same thing over and over again, bringing 'experts' into their studios, introducing a sentimental element of how 'Bharat' is under attack, churning out labels like '9/11' or something like 'maut ka aatank', trying to solve the mystery about the attackers by themselves, apportioning blame on the police for 'arriving late', and finally, ensuring that everything put out on the screen in 'exclusive'.The news channels, by and large, did not belie my expectations. And that is the point of this article. Whether it is a story about a stampede in a temple, a boy falling into a manhole, a thief being beaten up by the public, the Sensex going up or down, or an act of terrorism, the treatment by channels more or less follows the above routine. If one cares to go through the archives, one would find a striking similarity in even the words and phrases used then and now. Indian journalists have been reporting on conflicts and terrorism for over two decades now, from the militancy in Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir and the North-Eastern States, the low-intensity conflict on the India-Pakistan border, and in recent years, the number of attacks on several Indian cities -- even the Indian Parliament -- by terrorist groups.What is missing from reporting on terrorism in India, unfortunately, is the big picture, not only in terms of (a) exhaustive reportage on the event, but also in terms of (b) the geopolitical impact in the global sense.The first points to the gullibility of the journalists, the second to their lack of awareness. Whether both notions are wrong and such impressions are primarily caused by the newsroom chaos in handling breaking news, it is up to the channels to introspect.Keeping cool in breaking news situations is a basic tenet of journalism. A channel's coverage depends on it. Every news channel has its own editorial crisis news committee that oversees how breaking news is treated. But somewhere along the way, things snap.Often it is found there is no one in the newsroom drawing up coverage plans and directing the news team. But it is the 'live' element that dictates the coverage plan. As a result, a dish-it-as-it-comes mentality takes over. It is the duty of the newsroom seniors to ensure that information is not repeated throughout the news wheel, but is refreshed frequently. It is true that new information is flashed as soon as it comes, but it does not stand out in the general melee of visual loops and continuous, non-informative chats.In the initial hours of the Mumbai attacks, foreign channels were far ahead with factual information, which they culled out from blogs and chat rooms -- inputs coming from the guests in the hotels -- and strengthened with details from interviews, including with guests at the two hotels attacked by the terrorists.Broadcast journalism in India is no longer in its infancy and many of its practitioners have reported on conflicts worldwide and, therefore, there is no excuse for substandard coverage of such a serious issue. Secrecy and chaos on part of the official agencies and lack of access by journalists both played a role in this blank phase of news on the second day. Indian journalists, routinely attuned to covering crime, often find it difficult to cope with such situations. How to keep their channels moving forward? Lack of knowledge about the country's anti-terrorism apparatus, the types of agencies and personnel involved, and general information about their operational techniques hindered the journalists. Uninformed theories, reporters' opinions, even rumours were reported as news.Such reportage looks childish. Like, for instance, a channel showed its reporter, standing at the back of one of the Mumbai hotels, telling the audience that the police were clever enough to post themselves at the hotel's rear so that the terrorists would not be able to escape unnoticed. And that was an 'exclusive' report! Of course, the security agencies themselves exhibited an unprofessional manner in the way they happily chatted with the media about the operations. They did not even cordon off the hotels -- the first rule at a crime scene -- and the presence of media and onlookers turned the entire event into a 'tamasha'. And yet the Government had the gumption to issue notices to some news channels on coverage of the operations. Funny! But the point to ponder is: If a channel gets information of an ongoing security operation, should it use it with discretion to ensure that broadcast of such information does not harm the operation itself?What Indian broadcast journalism should now look for is specialised reporting on terrorism. Treating a terrorist strike story in the same way as a child falling into a manhole will not help, simply because news channels influence people's perceptions and an unprofessional approach to news dissemination can result in inappropriate fallouts. Also, terrorism is not a domestic issue restricted to the borders of one country. There was no attempt to see the strikes in the perspective of the global, or even sub-continental, spread of terrorism. This calls for journalists undergoing training programmes in terrorism reporting, on the lines of conflict reporting.It is also vital to develop a professional attitude when dealing with terrorism and not giving in to bouts of sentimentality and competition. It is professional to break the news first, but a race to break it can be hazardous in such situations, with accuracy, objectivity and credibility being the first victims.-- The writer is a senior Indian journalist, currently doing his PhD in the UK. vevemuri@gmail.com

We Need Nuclear Tests

Tuesday, November 24, 2009 New Delhi Today's Issue
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OPED Tuesday, July 15, 2008 Email Print

We need nuclear tests
Venkata Vemuri

When will India stand up for its own rights? The ongoing debate on the India-US nuclear deal skirts long-term issues linked to India's nuclear deterrence. It's facetious to describe the deal, as it exists, as good for India -- it is exactly the oppositeThe level of political debate in India on the nuclear deal with the US is as abysmal as the surreptitious attempt by the Indian bureaucracy to push it through on the ground that it is a matter of 'national pride'. Neither the Left, nor the Opposition, and certainly not the Manmohan Singh Government, has taken the people of India into confidence on the real issues that are of concern.These issues are crucial for India's long-term foreign and nuclear policies. We should be more concerned with India's strategic role vis-?-vis a futuristic -- but possible -- stand-off between China and the US, rather than the short-term gains in terms of nuclear energy or the one-upmanship game with Pakistan. India is already capable of tackling the last two.Let us proceed step by step. What did we achieve after the 1998 nuclear tests? It is an unspoken truth that the tests failed to validate some of India's warhead designs. Couple this with the fact that India is yet to possess comprehensive missile technology which can deliver warheads up to China, not merely Pakistan. Only when we have such a combination can we be confident that India has a credible nuclear deterrent. How do we reach that stage? By conducting more nuclear tests while continuing to make progress with the missile systems.Is India in a position to conduct more nuclear tests? India has offered a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear testing. If the nuclear deal comes through, the moratorium will no longer be voluntary, but legally binding on us. The proposed amendment to the US law that will make the nuclear deal official is that the American President will, from time to time, certify that India has not tested a nuclear device. Which means, if India conducts a test in the future, the deal becomes void.So, without a nuclear test, any thought of becoming a nuclear power or having a credible nuclear deterrent is a pipe dream.Then comes the issue related to availability of fissionable material for nuclear weaponisation. India has agreed, under the draft agreement of the deal, to identify and separate civil and military nuclear programmes. India has also agreed to place the civil facilities under IAEA safeguards. There are two issues here. First, the deal will not overnight give India the status of a nuclear weapons state. Far from it. It will be recognised as a non-nuclear weapons state which is not a signatory to the NPT. To that extent, India will be better off than Pakistan. That is not what India will be satisfied with, but has no option but to accept it. Second, once the civil facilities are under IAEA safeguards, there will be restrictions on the fissionable material for use in India's military facilities. India's nuclear doctrine depends on the availability of this material. For, the number of nuclear warheads India wishes to have to achieve the critical state of deterrence is determined by, first of all, India's threat perception and next, the material available for weaponisation. According to India's nuclear doctrine as it stands today, the limit of critical deterrence depends on its threat perception. Which means India can increase its nuclear stockpile if the threat perception increases. Such a doctrine allows India the advantage of not having to tie itself to a certain number of warheads. However, the IAEA safeguards will mean, at least theoretically, a weakened deterrence if India's adversaries increase their stockpiles. For, in such a situation, increasing India's own stockpile will depend on how much un-safeguarded material is available to it.According to an AP report on the draft of the safeguards agreement, a "key clause appears to call into question the effectiveness of any IAEA effort to ensure India's civilian nuclear activities do not aid its military's atomic weapons programme". The draft agreement in the preamble talks of India taking "corrective measures" to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civil nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of supplies. Possibly the only 'corrective measure' is India withdrawing some of the safeguarded civil facilities from the IAEA list so that the fissionable material can be used for military purposes. Having said that, the safeguards issue is not as serious as the moratorium on testing. It is well known that India has the capability to develop its own nuclear plants. Moreover, despite the agreement it will remain India's right to classify future nuclear plants as civil or military, thus giving the country an escape valve.What the entire debate on the deal boils down to, is this: Does India feel it requires a credible nuclear deterrent against China? If so, it has to clearly state its position before the current form of the deal is signed. Otherwise, its dream of having a credible deterrent and being a major nuclear power is washed out. Yes, India needs a nuclear deterrent against China insofar as its future geo-political stakes are concerned. Then why is the UPA Government shying away from stating this to the US? One point that goes in India's favour -- and a very vital one at that -- is that the US cannot face a standoff with China without the support of India. For facing China, both need each other. It is also true that the US excursions into Asia have a black and bleak record of failure. Vietnam, for example. In the future, any standoff with China can only be on the issue of Taiwan. And the odds of the US going it alone, without India's aid, are high. Let us just assume that the current deal actually goes through. Theoretically it is possible that the US itself may go in for nuclear testing in the future, thus allowing India to do so too. How is that possible? The current deal has a clause which says that India will assume responsibilities and reap the same benefits as accruing to states with advanced nuclear technology like the US. The flip side, however, is what if the US does not undertake tests in future? It is a big if.The nuclear deal by itself does not much harm Indian interests as long as India retains the right to conduct nuclear tests in the future. Indian bureaucrats, like the messy mice that they are, are already indulging in vacuous arguments that India's moratorium on tests is unilateral and, therefore, what is a unilateral proposition cannot be bound by an agreement. The why not get this included in the piece of paper?India is at present in a political turmoil over the deal. It may all come to a naught if the deal is not passed in the current session of the US Congress. The basic legal paper of the deal, called the Hyde Act, 2006, has a provision that the final agreement between the US and India can be taken up by the Congress for passage only if the Congress is in a continuous session for 30 days. There is a recess of the Congress in August, which leaves less than 40 days before the Congress adjourns on September 26, 2008.The 123 Agreement cannot come for passage until the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group okay the deal. How long will that take? It may come up for passage by IAEA in the coming three weeks, but indications are that the NSG may not convene on the issue till September. If so, there is no option but to wait for the post-Bush Administration to assume office. What have the Democrats in mind about the deal?More importantly, when will India stand up for its own rights? That is the prime issue. What is happening in India right now has so far nothing to do with this serious debate.-- The writer, a senior journalist, is doing his PhD at Bournemouth University, UK.

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